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Social entrepreneurs increasingly use franchising to scale social value. Tracey and Jarvis described 
how social franchising is like commercially-oriented franchising, but noted critical challenges aris-
ing from dual goals. We investigate a social franchisor that overcame these challenges and describe 
how the social mission became the source of business model innovation. We show that the social 
mission fostered a shared identity that guided the search for adaptations to the franchise model. 
The shared mission-driven identity created pressure toward (1) decentralized decision-mak-
ing, (2) shared governance, and (3) a role for the franchisor as orchestrator of collaborative 
knowledge sharing among franchisees. Findings should help social franchisors avoid common pit-
falls and suggest future research questions for social entrepreneurship and franchising scholars. 
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Interest in social entrepreneurship is rising rapidly, fostered in part by the celebration of heroic 
individuals who are “changing the world” (e.g., Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, & 
Reynolds, 2010). Social entrepreneurs create “social value by providing solutions to social prob-
lems” (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011, p. 1204) with the primary aim of advancing societal 
well-being (Stephan, Patterson, Kelly, & Mair, 2016). They typically pursue strategies that 
involve revenue-generating activities (Di Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010) and possess a 
strong desire to spread their solutions widely (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006; Smith, 
Kistruck, & Cannatelli, 2016). The focus on social value creation, usually embedded in an 
explicit social mission (Stevens, Moray, & Bruneel, 2015), makes social entrepreneurship dis-
tinct from commercial entrepreneurship in “multiple areas of enterprise management and person-
nel motivation” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 3).
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Social entrepreneurs have increasingly turned to franchising to scale social solutions and 
replicate success in new locations. Similar to commercial franchising, social franchising involves 
an organization (the social franchisor) allowing others (social franchisees) to offer its social solu-
tion using its brand name and operational processes in exchange for upfront and ongoing fees 
(cf., Combs, Ketchen, Shook, & Short, 2011). Social franchising is popular as evidenced by its 
widespread use by large social organizations such as The Big Issue, E4Impact, the School for 
Social Entrepreneurs, United Way, the Trussell Trust, and YMCA (cf. Oster, 1992; 1996) and 
dedicated support institutions, including the Social Sector Franchising initiative (www. soci alse 
ctor fran chising. org) of the International Franchise Association in the United States, and the 
International Center for Social Franchising (renamed “Spring Impact” in 2017) in the United 
Kingdom.
While scholars have extensively investigated commercial franchising (for reviews, see Combs 
et al., 2011; Gillis & Castrogiovanni, 2012), theoretical work on social franchising has pro-
gressed little since Tracey and Jarvis (2007). They found that, as in commercial franchising, 
access to capital and local expertise motivates social franchisors. However, Tracey and Jarvis 
(2007) also describe how the social mission generated conflicts that contributed to the demise of 
the organization they studied.
Studying failure is important, but it also raises questions about how so many social franchi-
sors successfully scale social value. Past research shows that the scaling up process is challeng-
ing for social entrepreneurs due to the absence of “ready-to-wear” business models (Baden-Fuller 
& Mangematin, 2013) for reconciling tensions between social and commercial goals (Moss, 
Short, Payne, & Lumpkin, 2011). However, scholars also theorized that these tensions might 
yield unexpected benefits by pushing social entrepreneurs to “engage in active integration 
attempts… to develop more novel and creative social enterprise models” (Wry & York, 2017, 
p. 453; see also, Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015). The purpose of this article, therefore, 
is to advance social entrepreneurship research by investigating the role of the social mission as a 
source of innovation in franchising models used to scale social value.
Our results are based on a 2005, 2015 field study of Impact Hub, a global network of social 
business incubators and co-working spaces that adopted franchising in its early years but, unlike 
the case described by Tracey and Jarvis (2007), innovated key elements of its business model 
(e.g., allocation of decision rights, franchisor–franchisee relationship) to successfully scale 
social value.1 Our analysis of interviews, direct observation, and archival documents confirms 
Tracey and Jarvis (2007) observation that franchisees’ business model must be financially and 
operationally replicable and that achieving balance between social and commercial goals is dif-
ficult. Moving beyond Tracey and Jarvis (2007), our findings offer two contributions. First, our 
data substantiate and elaborate recent theory suggesting that dual social and commercial mis-
sions can do more than create tension (Wry & York, 2017); the social mission generated a shared 
mission-driven identity that not only motivated stakeholders to resolve tensions but also guided 
adaptations that strengthened Impact Hub’s business model. Second, we contribute a description 
of the specific franchise business model adaptations that the shared mission-driven identity cre-
ated pressure toward—that is, (a) decentralized decision making, (b) shared governance, and 
(c) a shift in the franchisor’s role toward the orchestration of collaborative knowledge sharing 
among franchisees (away from vertical knowledge transfer).
Theoretical Background
The defining characteristic of social entrepreneurship is the entrepreneur’s focus on creating 
value for others rather than capturing it for themselves (Santos, 2012). Over the last two decades, 
research on social entrepreneurship expanded significantly (for a review, see Rey-Martí, 
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Ribeiro-Soriano, & Palacios-Marqués, 2016) and scholars widely debated whether social entre-
preneurship is a distinct area of inquiry from commercial entrepreneurship (cf., Nicholls, 2010). 
There is consensus that socially-oriented contexts introduce important differences (e.g., multiple 
institutional logics, Battilana & Lee, 2014; non-economic incentives, Miller, Grimes, McMullen, 
& Vogus, 2012) that challenge assumptions and insights from existing theories about commercial 
entrepreneurship  (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010). At the same time, there is recognition that 
many commercially-oriented organizations often seek to create social value (e.g., Austin, 
Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006) and that social entrepreneurs must introduce enough commer-
cial-orientation to remain viable (e.g., Smith, Besharov, Wessels, & Chertok, 2012). Thus, the 
distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurship can also be “conceptualized as a 
continuum ranging from purely social to purely economic. Even at the extremes… there are still 
elements of both” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 3).
Some social entrepreneurs devote themselves to serve specific local communities, while oth-
ers feel a moral urgency to scale up their initiatives (Smith et al., 2016) so that their “impact on 
society becomes wider (i.e., helps more people in more places) and deeper (i.e., reduces the 
problem’s negative effects more dramatically)” (Bloom & Smith, 2010, p. 127). In the scaling 
process, selecting appropriate business models is critical to ensure that social organizations 
“resist pressures to ‘drift’ toward either social or economic objectives at the expense of the other” 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 419). In recent years, social franchising has become very popular as a 
model for dealing with these challenges (e.g., Bruder, 2013, January), but research is still limited 
and relies mainly on theory adapted from commercial franchising (e.g., Oster, 1992; Oster, 
1996). We review these theoretical foundations briefly in the next sections. Table 1 summarizes 
research on commercial and social franchisors.
Research on Commercially-Oriented Franchises
Much of the research investigating franchising attempts to explain why and under what condi-
tions franchisors use franchisees rather than building and managing outlets through the corporate 
hierarchy. The first explanation was resource scarcity, which predicts that entrepreneurs fran-
chise in response to pressure to achieve economies of scale faster than available resources would 
otherwise permit (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). An entrepreneur with a locally successful business 
Table 1. Known Differences Between Commercial and Social Franchising.
Commercial franchising Social franchising
Strategic goal (Primarily) value appropriation and 
aligning incentives between franchisor and 
franchisees.
(Primarily) Value creation with dual 
commercial and social goals.
Motivation for 
franchising
Franchisors’ gain access to franchisees’ 
capital and labor with low selection and 
monitoring costs. Franchisees seek high 
returns relative to risks.
Franchisors share their solution to a 
social problem. Franchisees may become 
part of a larger movement and solve a 
social problem locally.
Sources of 
conflict
Franchisors might not offer adequate 
support service or brand building; 
franchisees might fail to maintain quality 
(i.e., free ride).
Overemphasis by either party of the 
social mission at the expenses of 
economic sustainability, or vice versa.
Key reference Combs et al. (2011) Tracey and Jarvis (2007)
Giudici et al. 291
model can grow quickly with fewer resources because franchisees invest their own capital and 
labor (Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006).
The second more dominant explanation, agency theory, predicts that franchisors use franchis-
ing in situations where the costs of monitoring local employee-managers are high compared to the 
cost of using franchisees (Gillis & Castrogiovanni, 2012). Such costs are higher, for example, 
when outlets are geographically dispersed (Perryman & Combs, 2012), in unfamiliar markets 
(Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995), or too small to monitor efficiently (Lafontaine, 1992). 
Franchisees are less expensive because their invested labor and capital gives them a strong incen-
tive to work hard to maximize outlet profits (Rubin, 1978), but franchisees might do so in ways 
that do not benefit the franchisor or other outlets in the system. Franchisees might, for example, 
boost profits by reducing quality (Jin & Leslie, 2009), refusing to participate in promotions (i.e., 
“participation may vary”), or failing to upgrade facilities (Bradach, 1997; Kidwell, Nygaard, & 
Silkoset, 2007). These actions harm the brand’s overall image (Michael, 2000) and result in less 
franchising (relative to corporate ownership) when a standardized brand image is important 
(Lafontaine & Shaw, 2005).
Other research focuses on structural and social relationships between franchisees and the 
franchisor. Structurally, franchise business models differ according to whether customers rely on 
the brand to signal a common experience, which requires franchisors to centralize decision mak-
ing and put systems in place to maximize standardization (Ater & Rigbi, 2015; Bradach, 1997), 
resulting in what Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) call a “carbon copy” form. In situations where 
customers do not travel, a physical product is involved, or service delivery is complex (Mumdžiev 
& Windsperger, 2011), decisions can be decentralized to franchisees resulting in a “confedera-
tion form” (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998). Franchise systems also change and evolve over time. 
Young franchisors often have under-developed franchisee support but develop training, commu-
nication systems, and centralized support as they grow (Shane, 2001). Finally, franchise systems 
change when franchisees develop new process and product innovations that the franchisor learns 
about and implements system-wide (Bradach, 1997; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Kaufmann & 
Eroglu, 1999).
Research also describes how the social relationship between franchisees and the franchisor 
affects important outcomes. Relational norms such as trust (Chiou, Hsieh, & Yang, 2004), com-
munication (Meek, Davis-Sramek, Baucus, & Germain, 2011), and cohesion (El Akremi, 
Mignonac, & Perrigot, 2011) have been tied to outcomes such as franchisee satisfaction, commit-
ment, and compliance. The social relationship appears particularly important when franchisees 
have greater autonomy (Cochet, Dormann, & Ehrmann, 2008). Indeed, when relational norms 
break down, franchisees often join (adversarial) independent associations to counterbalance the 
franchisor’s power (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011).
Overall, research focused on commercial franchising describes multiple reasons why fran-
chising is used over company ownership and points to important differences among franchisors 
regarding key business model elements, such as the level of franchisee autonomy and the nature 
of the relationship between the franchisor and franchisees.
Scaling Social Value Through (Social) Franchising
Social franchising is definitionally the same as commercial franchising in that it involves a con-
tractual arrangement wherein a brand name and operational support are offered to local franchi-
sees in exchange for up-front fees (usually) and on-going royalties/fees (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007; 
Combs et al., 2011). As in social entrepreneurship more generally, it differs in that social value 
creation is more important relative to financial value capture (cf., Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & 
Ireland, 2011). Franchising is attractive for social organizations because it promises an efficient 
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and sustainable business model to spread social solutions. It is also attractive for local social 
entrepreneurs because it provides a structured way to solve a local social problem and offers an 
opportunity to become part of a larger socially-oriented community. Despite its attractiveness, 
however, social franchising appears more challenging in practice than what is suggested by its 
appearance as a “ready-to-wear” business model.
Although scholarly research is limited, two kinds of social franchises can be identified. First, 
micro-franchising involves the use of franchising to generate social benefits in base-of-the-pyra-
mid markets by giving beneficiaries job opportunities as franchisees (Alon, 2014; Christensen, 
Parsons, & Fairbourne, 2010). The Big Issue (www. bigissue. com), for instance, uses micro-fran-
chising to provide job opportunities to homeless people in the UK. Once vetted, homeless people 
are authorized to sell the Big Issue magazine. They buy copies upfront from the franchisor and 
retain all profit from sales. Recognizing challenges that like-for-like adoption of commercial 
franchising entails in such contexts,  Kistruck et al. (2011) suggested certain business model 
adaptations. They stressed the need to give micro-franchisees more flexibility to tailor offerings 
to local conditions and advocated for a more consultative franchisor role. Micro-franchising, 
however, involves a very close overlap between franchisees and the beneficiaries of the intended 
social impact.
Tracey and Jarvis (2007) investigated a second type of franchising wherein franchisees are 
geographically dispersed social organizations that, in turn, deliver social value to beneficiaries. 
They investigated Aspire, a UK-based organization that partnered with local nonprofit franchi-
sees to provide employment for homeless beneficiaries. They found similarities with commercial 
franchises in that Aspire tried to overcome resource scarcities that might have otherwise hin-
dered growth. However, contrary to agency theory’s prediction that the best franchisees will 
self-select and self-monitor (Rubin, 1978; Shane, 1996), they found that Aspire incurred higher 
selection and monitoring costs because franchisees’ goals diverged from its own by over-empha-
sizing the social mission at the expense of economic sustainability. More recently, scholars used 
the Aspire case to show how the social mission made it easier to overlook franchisee-agents’ 
competence and removed economic incentives as an effective motivational tool, creating “stew-
ardship costs” (Krzeminska & Zeyen, 2017).
The Aspire case provides important foundations for understanding what makes social fran-
chising challenging, but its failure does not explain the many successful examples found in 
practice. The Trussell Trust (www. trusselltrust. org), for instance, uses franchising to manage 400 
foodbanks across the UK. In 2016, it provided nearly 1.2 million 3-day emergency food pack-
ages to end-beneficiaries. E4Impact (www. e4impact. org) delivers higher-education programs for 
social entrepreneurs in several sub-Saharan African countries through a system of university 
partners serving as local franchisees. To date, it has trained around 650 social entrepreneurs 
across seven countries, supporting the creation of nearly 3,500 jobs with impact on over 180,000 
end-beneficiaries. Thus, while social entrepreneurship research points to a general need for busi-
ness model adaptation to reconcile social and commercial goals (e.g., Wry & York, 2017), fran-
chising remains under-theorized and lacks empirical evidence about the types of adaptations that 
might work.
Method
To illuminate successful adaptations in the social franchise context, we conducted a qualitative 
field study, which is fitting due to the early stage of theory development (cf. Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013). We studied Impact Hub, the largest global network of business incubators and 
co-working spaces devoted to socially-oriented organizations. The social mission of Impact 
Hub is 
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to support enterprising initiatives for a better world by growing a locally rooted, globally connected 
community for measurable positive impact. [It] seeks to inspire, connect, and enable people to take 
entrepreneurial action in order to pioneer a just and sustainable world where business and profit are 
used in service of people and planet (Impact Hub, Article of Associations 2.1).
Tenants incubating at Impact Hubs are mostly individuals or organizations that themselves have 
a social mission. Our analysis focuses on 2005–2015 when, similar to Tracey and Jarvis (2007), 
Impact Hub experienced notable growth and turbulence. Contrary to their case, however, Impact 
Hub did not collapse but innovated its business model with adaptations to accommodate its dual 
social and commercial goals.
Data Collection
Data collection spanned 8 years, with primary data collection from 2011 through 2015 and con-
firmatory follow-ups in 2017 and 2018. As summarized in Table 2, we conducted 33 interviews, 
participated in more than a dozen events, engaged in field visits to multiple countries, and 
attended the global gathering in 2015. In the first data collection round, we selected interviewees 
through personal connections with our local hub manager, and then used referrals to connect with 
additional hub managers. In the second round, we obtained endorsement from Impact Hub’s 
senior actors who provided additional contacts. One researcher conducted first round interviews, 
and another conducted the remaining rounds.
We fully briefed all informants about the academic nature of the research and reassured them 
that their personal names and business names would be anonymized to encourage full informa-
tion sharing. The questions we asked were initially exploratory—for example, “What is the rela-
tionship between your hub and other hubs in the network?” As we compared emerging evidence 
with the literature (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014), the questions evolved into semistruc-
tured interviews with an increased focus on franchisee–franchisor and cross-hub relationships—
for example, “How did governance work when your hub was launched? What were the terms of 
agreement, and how did they evolve over time?” Given our reliance on retrospective interviews, 
we proactively counterbalanced risks of recall bias by triangulating evidence with other data 
sources, including archival material, but mostly direct observation and experience. These activi-
ties allowed us “to gain first hand exposure to the processes under study, instead of solely relying 
on interviewee accounts” (Danneels, 2002, p. 1098).
Data Analysis
Our data analysis followed analytical procedures set out by Gioia et al. (2013). We followed 
three key steps to make sure that empirical observations were “connected to extant theoretical 
ideas to generate novel conceptual insight and distinctions” (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & 
Van de Ven, 2013, p. 11). This analytical process requires researchers to systematically examine 
competing theoretical explanations in light of emerging empirical evidence. Figure 1 presents 
our final coding structure.
Step 1. Event-History Analysis and Open Coding. We started by creating a database based on the 
chronology of our material and field notes. This step was useful to make sense of our material 
and to reconstruct the history of Impact Hub. After each interview round, we engaged in a pro-
cess of “open-coding” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) wherein we read the transcripts line-by-line and 
created a dataset of codes using words or short phrases summarizing the meaning of different 
parts of text (i.e., in-vivo codes; cf. Gioia et al., 2013). For example, we used the code “identity” 
294 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 44(2)
Ta
bl
e 
2.
 D
at
a 
U
se
 a
nd
 S
ou
rc
es
.
D
at
a 
so
u
rc
es
Ty
p
e 
o
f 
d
at
a
U
se
 in
 t
h
e 
an
al
ys
is
D
ir
ec
t 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
A
tt
en
d
an
ce
 t
o
 lo
ca
l e
ve
n
ts
 a
n
d
 m
ee
ti
n
gs
 (
20
11
, 2
01
5)
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
to
 1
1 
ev
en
ts
 a
nd
 w
or
ks
ho
ps
 o
pe
n 
to
 h
ub
 m
em
be
rs
 a
t 
Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
 M
ila
n 
(6
) 
an
d 
Lo
nd
on
 K
in
g 
C
ro
ss
 (
6)
.
F
ie
ld
 v
is
it
s 
(2
01
1,
 2
01
6)
fiv
e 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l v
is
its
 t
o 
Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
 M
ila
n 
w
ith
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
  
st
ud
en
ts
.
R
eg
ul
ar
 c
lin
ic
s 
w
ith
 m
em
be
rs
 a
t 
Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
s 
in
 L
on
do
n.
V
is
it 
at
 Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
 A
cc
ra
.
A
tt
en
d
an
ce
 t
o
 t
h
e 
Im
p
ac
t 
H
u
b
’s
 g
lo
b
al
 g
at
h
er
in
g 
U
n
lik
el
y 
A
lli
es
 (
Ju
n
e 
20
15
)
N
on
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n 
fo
r 
2 
da
ys
 (
op
en
 t
o 
hu
b 
fo
un
de
rs
 a
nd
 
st
af
f m
em
be
rs
 o
nl
y)
 d
ed
ic
at
ed
 t
o 
th
e 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
of
 t
he
 1
0 
ye
ar
s 
of
 
th
e 
ne
tw
or
k 
an
d 
th
e 
di
sc
us
si
on
 o
f i
ts
 fu
tu
re
 e
vo
lu
tio
n.
A
cq
ui
ri
ng
 fa
m
ili
ar
ity
 w
ith
 t
he
 Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
t.
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 t
he
 m
is
si
on
 a
nd
 m
od
us
 o
pe
ra
nd
i o
f I
m
pa
ct
 H
ub
.
G
ai
ni
ng
 in
si
gh
ts
 a
bo
ut
 Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
 e
xt
er
na
l c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n,
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l i
m
ag
e 
an
d 
id
en
tit
y.
G
ai
ni
ng
 in
si
gh
ts
 o
n 
m
em
be
rs
’ a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
nd
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n
G
ai
ni
ng
 in
si
gh
ts
 a
bo
ut
 lo
ca
l a
da
pt
at
io
n 
in
 a
 r
ec
en
tly
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
hu
b.
G
ai
ni
ng
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
ab
ou
t 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 r
el
at
ed
 is
su
es
; t
ri
an
gu
la
tio
n 
of
 
da
ta
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 fr
om
 o
th
er
 s
ou
rc
es
; m
em
be
r 
va
lid
at
io
n.
In
te
rv
ie
w
s
S
em
is
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
– 
fi
rs
t 
ro
u
n
d
 (
20
11
)
17
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
ith
 Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
 fo
un
de
rs
 a
nd
  
m
an
ag
er
s.
S
em
is
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
– 
se
co
n
d
 r
o
u
n
d
 (
20
14
, 2
01
5)
fiv
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
ith
 Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
 fo
un
de
rs
 a
nd
 m
an
ag
er
s.
S
em
i-
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
– 
th
ir
d
 r
o
u
n
d
 (
20
15
)
fo
ur
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
ith
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 g
lo
ba
l m
an
ag
em
en
t 
te
am
 o
f 
Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
.
C
o
n
fi
rm
at
o
ry
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
– 
fo
u
rt
h
 r
o
u
n
d
 (
20
17
, 2
01
8)
fo
ur
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
ith
 t
w
o 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 g
lo
ba
l m
an
ag
em
en
t 
te
am
 
of
 Im
pa
ct
 H
ub
 p
lu
s 
th
re
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
ith
 s
en
io
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 
so
ci
al
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
fr
an
ch
is
in
g 
bu
si
ne
ss
 m
od
el
.
Bu
ild
in
g, 
in
te
gr
at
in
g, 
va
lid
at
in
g 
th
e 
ev
en
t 
hi
st
or
y 
da
ta
ba
se
.
G
ai
ni
ng
 in
si
gh
ts
 a
bo
ut
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
w
ith
in
 t
he
 fr
an
ch
is
e 
w
hi
le
 t
he
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
 w
as
 s
til
l i
n 
flu
x.
G
ai
ni
ng
 fu
rt
he
r 
in
si
gh
ts
 a
bo
ut
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
w
ith
in
 t
he
 fr
an
ch
is
e 
af
te
r 
its
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
re
ac
he
d 
st
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 m
at
ur
ed
.
Tr
ia
ng
ul
at
in
g 
fa
ct
s 
an
d 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n;
 e
xp
lo
ri
ng
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
e’
s 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
 a
nd
 t
he
ir
 r
at
io
na
le
.
C
on
fir
m
in
g 
fin
al
 d
at
a 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
th
eo
ri
za
tio
n;
 s
tr
en
gt
he
ni
ng
 
th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l f
or
 a
na
ly
tic
 g
en
er
al
iz
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 t
ra
ns
fe
ra
bi
lit
y 
of
 fi
nd
in
gs
.
Giudici et al. 295
to summarize “it is [Impact Hub’s] DNA, there is a common cause, common identity.” Next, we 
consolidated redundancies and defined our first-order categories so that they reflect our infor-
mants’ concepts-in-use (Gephart, 2004). For example, in-vivo codes such as “falling in love with 
the founder’s idea” and “being inspired to launch a new hub after meeting the founder” were 
consolidated into the first-order code “inspiring others to join.”
Step 2.  Axial Coding. We coded the data via several cycles of comparisons between data and the-
ory, acting as knowledgeable agents (Gioia et al., 2013) to interpret evidence. We initially 
grouped first-order categories according to areas of prior research on social entrepreneurship 
(e.g., “following the mission as the authority”), business models (e.g., “creating an inverted 
power structure”), and social movements (e.g., “offering the opportunity to be part of a global 
network of ‘impact-makers’”). We also distinguished data as being related to either the franchi-
sor or franchisees. We then grouped conceptually overlapping first-order categories into sec-
ond-order themes (Gioia et al., 2013). Finally, two authors read the evidence independently and 
worked closely comparing and discussing their coding structures. This effort teased out some 
factors seemingly central in the challenges experienced by Impact Hub. Pressures on the franchi-
sor’s business model from conflict between franchisor and franchisee expectations were particu-
larly evident.
Step 3. Generating Propositions. In the last step, we compared our second-order themes with theo-
retical predictions and insights in extant literature. That is, “to develop and contextualize our 
Figure 1. Coding structure.
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findings theoretically” (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007, p. 673), we asked how our emerging theory was 
similar or different from prior social entrepreneurship and franchising research. We repeated this 
process until we were able to aggregate our second-order themes into stable aggregate dimen-
sions reflecting an even higher degree of abstraction. “Social mission as a source of franchise 
model innovation” and “mission-driven identity adaptations to social franchise model” were the 
final aggregate dimensions used to derive our propositions. To check the “trustworthiness” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) of our work during the data collection, we regularly discussed emerging 
findings with key informants.
Research Setting: Social Franchising at Impact Hub
Impact Hub is a global network of organizations that provides a mix of co-working spaces and 
incubation services mostly to socially-oriented organizations and individuals (called “mem-
bers”). At the time of final writing, Impact Hub had 103 hubs in six continents with over 16,000 
members (for detailed narratives, see Bachmann, 2014, and Watson, 2015).
“The Hub” (renamed “Impact Hub” after a 2013 trademark dispute) was launched in London, 
UK, in 2005 by a group of students with experience in international NGOs and UN agencies. It 
was informally led by Jonathan Robinson, a young anthropology graduate. Between 2005 and 
2007, with funding provided by impact investors, Robinson and colleagues ran the first hub in a 
3,230-squarefoot space on the top floor of an old warehouse in London’s Islington district. The 
business model was membership-based and rather simple, revolving around a mix of co-working 
space rental, event organizing, and member-led business clinics. Members paid a fee based on 
the amount of time and space they needed. In 2008, following the opening of nine new locations 
around the world, Impact Hub adopted franchising. This decision had been inspired by the Body 
Shop’s franchise, since one of the early investors was Gordon Roddick, co-founder of the Body 
Shop. According to one informant (Hub #7a),
[The team was] very much influenced by… a group of visionary people who had founded the Big 
Issue and the Body Shop… [Impact Hub] was conceived… with a model that blended business and 
social aspects… a sort of micro Body Shop, with a profit entity at its centre.
The franchisor became a limited liability company called Hub World owned by Robinson. By 
2010, Impact Hubs were in 27 cities worldwide with a long list of prospective applicants.
This rapid growth, however, brought significant organizational challenges due to rising diver-
gence between the way the franchisor and franchisees envisioned the evolution of Impact Hub’s 
business model. We investigated these challenges and the subsequent changes in Impact Hub’s 
business model. Remarkably, Impact Hub did not collapse but managed to reorganize and sustain 
its growth trajectory. Key milestones are summarized in Figure 2.
Findings
Our purpose is to use the Impact Hub case to learn about the different ways that the social mis-
sion affects successful adaptation of the franchising business model. The findings are organized 
in two sections according to the coding structure in Figure 1. Overall, we found six second-order 
themes that we grouped under two aggregate dimensions. The first aggregate dimension describes 
how Impact Hub’s social mission fostered a shared identity that became the source of motivation 
for stakeholders to come together and search for innovative ways to adapt the franchise business 
model to better accommodate competing financial and social pressures. The second describes 
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how this mission-driven identity fostered specific and ultimately more successful business model 
adaptations.
After describing the evidence supporting each aggregate dimension, we compare the case 
with prior research on franchising and advance propositions regarding the role of the social mis-
sion in (a) sparking the search for business model innovation and (b) guiding the successful 
adaptations that Impact Hub adopted. Table 3 summarizes key implications of the social mission 
among more commercially- and more socially-oriented franchises.
Social Mission as a Source of Franchise Business Model Innovation
While the business model for franchisees was fairly clear, simple, and replicable, Impact Hub 
faced several challenges as a franchisor as it worked to establish a business model that was both 
financially sound and capable of scaling social value.
Attractive vision for social change. The vision of Robinson and his co-founders was to gather ear-
ly-stage and aspiring social entrepreneurs to create a community of likeminded people with the 
drive to create social value and positively impact their local communities—so called “impact-mak-
ers.” The first hub in London had few plans to expand geographically but the value proposition 
proved to be attractive for people who sought to be part of something larger and wanted to repli-
cate the approach. “People start coming in asking how they could make a hub in their own coun-
tries, and they started opening hubs here and there…” (Hub #6 [interviewee numbers were 
randomly assigned]). “We all were looking for ways to have a social impact,” another newcomer 
(Hub #12) observed, “We were all attracted to the idea of not just starting a business, but of unit-
ing and enabling others to have an impact.” Most of these people already knew one another 
through participation in other international student networks and had experience working in 
international NGOs or government agencies.
At the time, Robinson traveled extensively, inspiring others to join. “Immediately when I met 
him, I felt in love with him, with the idea, with the legend and the story of the Hub,” remembered 
an early (local Hub) founder (Hub #18). His approach was captivating, and he was granting the 
license to the brand in an informal way. “We started very much in friendship,” another informant 
(Hub #1) who joined in that period pointed out, “We ended up signing an agreement… to 
Figure 2. Impact hub milestone.
298 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 44(2)
Ta
bl
e 
3.
 I
m
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 S
oc
ia
l M
is
si
on
 fo
r 
Fr
an
ch
is
e 
Bu
si
ne
ss
 M
od
el
s.
M
o
re
 c
o
m
m
er
ci
al
ly
-o
ri
en
te
d
 f
ra
n
ch
is
es
M
o
re
 s
o
ci
al
ly
-o
ri
en
te
d
 f
ra
n
ch
is
e
F
ra
n
ch
is
in
g 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
M
o
d
el
(P
1a
-c
)
M
us
t 
re
lia
bl
y 
de
liv
er
 e
co
no
m
ic
 r
et
ur
ns
 t
ha
t 
at
tr
ac
t 
an
d 
ke
ep
 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s. 
Fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
pa
y 
fe
es
 a
nd
 r
oy
al
ty
 in
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
fo
r 
re
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 c
en
tr
al
 s
up
po
rt
 s
er
vi
ce
s. 
Ec
on
om
ic
 
pr
ofi
t 
is
 c
en
tr
al
 m
ot
iv
at
io
n 
bu
t 
so
ci
al
 id
en
tit
y 
m
at
te
rs
 t
oo
.
M
us
t 
re
lia
bl
y 
so
lv
e 
a 
so
ci
al
 p
ro
bl
em
 t
ha
t 
at
tr
ac
ts
 fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
w
hi
le
 g
en
er
at
in
g 
se
lf-
su
st
ai
ni
ng
 e
co
no
m
ic
 r
et
ur
ns
. F
ra
nc
hi
se
es
 
pa
y 
fe
es
 a
nd
 r
oy
al
tie
s 
in
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
fo
r 
re
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 
ce
nt
ra
l s
up
po
rt
 s
er
vi
ce
s. 
So
ci
al
 m
is
si
on
-d
ri
ve
n 
id
en
tit
y 
is
 
ce
nt
ra
l m
ot
iv
at
io
n,
 b
ut
 e
co
no
m
ic
 s
ta
bi
lit
y 
m
at
te
rs
 t
oo
.
D
ec
is
io
n
 M
ak
in
g 
(P
2a
)
C
en
tr
al
iz
ed
 w
he
n 
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ar
ou
nd
 a
 c
om
m
on
 
br
an
d 
is
 im
po
rt
an
t, 
bu
t 
de
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 fo
r 
th
os
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
th
at
 
re
qu
ir
e 
lo
ca
l a
da
pt
at
io
n 
(e
.g
., 
pr
ic
in
g)
 a
nd
 w
he
n 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s’
 
ta
sk
s 
ar
e 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 s
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
 a
nd
/o
r 
cu
st
om
er
s 
do
 n
ot
 
ex
pe
ct
 it
.
M
os
tly
 d
ec
en
tr
al
iz
ed
 t
o 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
w
ho
 c
an
 b
e 
tr
us
te
d 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 a
 s
ha
re
d 
id
en
tit
y; 
ce
rt
ai
n 
fu
nc
tio
ns
 (
e.
g.
, s
up
po
rt
 
se
rv
ic
es
) 
ar
e 
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 b
ut
 fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
ca
n 
im
pl
em
en
t 
fle
xi
bl
y. 
Fr
an
ch
is
or
 a
ct
iv
el
y 
pr
om
ot
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
s 
(e
.g
., 
th
ro
ug
h 
se
le
ct
io
n)
 s
ha
re
d 
m
is
si
on
-d
ri
ve
n 
id
en
tit
y.
G
ov
er
n
an
ce
(P
2b
)
Fr
an
ch
is
or
 o
w
ns
 a
nd
 r
un
s 
th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
e.
 F
ra
nc
hi
se
es
 m
ay
 
pr
og
re
ss
iv
el
y 
ga
in
 v
oi
ce
 t
hr
ou
gh
 s
oc
ia
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 a
nd
 v
ia
 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
 c
ou
nc
ils
/a
ss
oc
ia
tio
ns
.
Sh
ar
ed
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
w
ith
 fr
eq
ue
nt
 in
pu
t 
fr
om
 fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
is
 
de
si
ra
bl
e 
an
d 
po
ss
ib
le
 b
ec
au
se
 it
 a
lig
ns
 w
ith
 t
he
 s
oc
ia
l m
is
si
on
. 
A
t 
th
e 
ex
tr
em
e,
 t
he
 s
ha
re
d 
m
is
si
on
 m
ak
es
 s
ha
re
d 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
po
ss
ib
le
.
R
o
le
 o
f 
th
e 
F
ra
n
ch
is
o
r
(P
2c
)
Fr
an
ch
is
or
 t
ea
ch
es
 fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 m
od
el
 (
i.e
., 
ve
rt
ic
al
 le
ar
ni
ng
) 
an
d 
m
on
ito
rs
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n.
 C
ha
ng
es
 t
o 
th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 m
od
el
 s
om
et
im
es
 s
ta
rt
s 
w
ith
 fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
bu
t 
ar
e 
ve
tt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
or
 b
ef
or
e 
w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n.
Fr
an
ch
is
or
 o
rc
he
st
ra
te
s 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
sh
ar
in
g 
am
on
g 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
(i.
e.
, h
or
iz
on
ta
l l
ea
rn
in
g)
 a
nd
 s
up
po
rt
s 
in
no
va
tio
n.
 F
ra
nc
hi
se
e 
in
no
va
tio
ns
 a
re
 s
ha
re
d 
w
id
el
y 
an
d 
in
di
vi
du
al
 fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
de
ci
de
 
w
hi
ch
 in
no
va
tio
ns
 t
o 
im
pl
em
en
t.
Giudici et al. 299
demonstrate that we were part of a global world… more like a commitment fee.” The original 
agreement required a licensing fee to use the brand name but had no other particular require-
ments. In 2007, the founding team received over one hundred requests to replicate hubs in other 
cities and, by 2008, nine new hubs were established.
The attractiveness of the vision generated significant challenges because “the bottom-up pull 
was so strong that London did not have the capacity to direct [the process],” argued one infor-
mant (Hub #10). The need for a more robust business model that could sustain growth became 
evident. At a lively meeting in Belgium in 2008, a franchising structure was agreed upon that 
required a £30,000 franchising fee plus an 8% royalty fee on revenue. The newly created fran-
chisor, Hub World, was controlled by Robinson and tasked with providing services such as con-
sulting on new hub openings and supporting shared IT. The original plan was to transfer equal 
shares of Hub World to each local hub and introduce more decentralized decision making. 
“People bought into the concept of the central organization [to be] implemented as a social fran-
chise with a legal franchise agreement but run very much as a large partnership” (Hub #8).” “We 
constantly had to innovate… innovation was both a need and an inherent motivation to co-create 
something together worth doing,” argued another: “Unlike the [commercial] franchise approach… 
we were driven by purpose and by the ability to respond to societal goals: we had to seek a form 
to support that” (Hub #1).
When we compare our second-order theme attractive vision for social change with franchis-
ing research and Tracey and Jarvis (2007) failed social franchise case, we see an attractive social 
vision as a necessary but not sufficient condition for scaling social value through franchising. In 
both cases, franchisees were attracted to the social vision and it is difficult to imagine their 
achieving similar growth without attractive social visions. While commercial franchisees might 
also be attracted to the franchisor’s corporate social responsibility profile, more commercial-
ly-oriented franchisees are unlikely to give up a significant portion of their return on capital and 
labor in exchange for the privilege of being involved in social value creation (cf. Shane, 1996). 
However, an attractive vision for social change is not sufficient. As in commercial franchising, 
successful geographic expansion depends on the presence of a business model that can be repli-
cated and that delivers sufficient economic returns to attract and retain good franchisees (Combs 
et al., 2011). A major reason for the collapse of the social franchise described by Tracey and 
Jarvis (2007) was that the franchisees’ business model—that is, employing the homeless in cat-
alog distribution and order fulfillment—while attractive, proved too difficult for franchisees to 
replicate. Impact Hub went through similar challenges.
[Impact Hub] attracted amazing people… In anything to do with social entrepreneurship… there is 
the sense of the vision of what is possible which attracts people and brings people together… but 
then there is the functionality of making it actually work… if you cannot sustain yourself, then you 
are gone and so goes the social mission (Hub #1).
Accordingly, scaling social value through franchising appears to require both a replicable and 
financially stable franchisee business model and an attractive vision for social change that draws 
franchisees in (and thus generates growth).
Proposition 1a: Successfully scaling social value through social franchising requires both a finan-
cially stable and replicable business model and an attractive vision for social change.
Struggle with the franchisor’s model. The adoption of a model that mirrored commercial franchising 
yet with a social mission did not reduce turbulence among stakeholders. Tensions rose once 
again for three main reasons. First, the transfer of shares to franchisees was never implemented, 
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leaving Robinson as the sole shareholder and creating a decision-making bottleneck. This “led to 
a quite conflictual period” (Hub #11). Second, the operational support provided by Hub World 
did not improve sufficiently and franchisees started questioning the value received for the money. 
“[They were saying], understandably to me, ‘I am paying a chunk of money to this central orga-
nization for support and so on… what value is it providing to me?’” (Hub #8). Third, the terms 
of the franchising agreement were problematic because the hefty financial conditions and limited 
support hindered local franchisees who struggled to cover royalty payments. “It was a cascade 
system…” because paying Hub World high fees forced franchisees to charge their local members 
more and “this created very high entry barriers [to attract paying members]” (Hub #10).
The situation degenerated quickly because Hub World was increasingly under pressure from 
its investors and had to chase fees from local hubs to stay alive. One informant (Hub #7a) remem-
bered that “[Robinson] had likely negotiated a certain return on investment with [investors]… 
and was meeting people around the world to collect promises from prospective founders [to 
show investors.].” “[Jonathan] was telling a story: ‘let’s make the world better, but then give me 
the money’… People could see that these two things were in conflict… [some] felt that Hub 
World was like ‘a mother eating her own children’” (Hub HQ). Some franchisees—particularly 
those who did not attend the meeting in Belgium—stopped paying their royalties, adding pres-
sure on Hub World. At the beginning of 2010, all those involved had “to acknowledge that the 
system did not work anymore” (Hub #15).
In February 2010, around 50 people gathered in Amsterdam to discuss the challenges sur-
rounding the franchisor’s business model. Robinson and his team faced difficult questions from 
Hub World investors and franchisees about strategy, leadership, and budget. Attendees recalled 
heated discussions. There was general recognition of the need for change but little agreement on 
what to do. “We’d been very excited about what we want to do, but did we really want to fight 
for a better model? …We needed it, but there was no model” (Hub #6). The meeting became a 
watershed moment with a real chance that the franchise would disband. Investors who had pro-
vided funding to Robinson in previous years were demanding rights to the brand and repayment 
of their money, and some franchisees decided to abandon Impact Hub. In the end, most partici-
pants decided to establish a working group with key stakeholder representatives to explore and 
propose a new business model.
In March and April 2010, the working group benchmarked organizations perceived as simi-
lar—for example, AIESEC ( aiesec. org) and the Swedish Natural Step (www. thenaturalstep. 
org)—and proposed a novel business model called the “Volcano Model” because of its bot-
tom-up governance structure. This model was then extensively discussed and modified before 
being approved in early 2011. In the meantime, for nearly a year, the Hub World franchisor was 
left running at limited capacity and did not experience significant growth. The final approved 
business model created a new central organization, "Hub Association,” in the form of a nonprofit 
entity collectively co-owned by all local hubs as equal shareholders. Impact Hub was “effec-
tively, still following the social franchising model” (member of the global management team, 
Hub HQ; cf., Watson, 2015); each local hub paid a franchising fee and a royalty on revenues, 
albeit much less than before at €15,000 and 2.5%, respectively.
In comparing the second-order theme struggle with the franchisor’s model to research on 
commercial franchising, we see important commonalities between commercial and social fran-
chising. While commercial franchisees have less commitment to a social mission, they are both 
financially and personally (through their labor—Norton, 1988) committed to the brand and iden-
tify deeply with it (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011). Thus, when franchisors fail to provide ade-
quate support (e.g., Shane, 2001) or take actions that franchisees believe threaten their livelihood 
(Cochet & Ehrmann, 2007), for example, by offering pricing discounts that generate royalty 
revenue for the franchisor but harm franchisees (Lafontaine, 1999), angry franchisees band 
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together to call for change, often through independent associations (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 
2010). High royalties and inadequate support similarly angered Impact Hub’s franchisees and, 
just as commercial franchisees’ anger is heightened by their strong brand identification (Lawrence 
& Kaufmann, 2011), social franchisees’ anger is heightened by their sense of injustice with 
respect to their commitment to the social mission.
What made Impact Hub different is that franchisees stayed committed because they “believed” 
in the social mission and were “neither willing to abandon it nor to let financial considerations 
take over without a counterproposal” (Hub #7a). Further, rather than taking an adversarial stance, 
key stakeholders—that is, investors and franchisees—shared a commitment to the social mission 
that led to a process wherein they engaged in “multiple and progressively more creative integra-
tion attempts” to generate a novel business model that successfully integrates social and com-
mercial goals (Wry & York, 2017, p. 451). The shared mission created a bond among Impact 
Hub’s stakeholders that motivated them to work through the challenges and find adaptations to 
the business model to overcome the problems they confronted:
Proposition 1b: The more important the franchisor’s social mission, the more it creates pressure to 
engage in business model innovation to resolve tensions between social and financial goals.
Finally, the aggregate dimension social mission as a source of franchise model innovation sees 
the mission-driven identity as a guide for business model innovations that reconcile social and 
commercial goals (see Figure 1). Facing the collapse of the franchise, franchisees came together 
around what united them in the first place: their mission-driven identity. “Those were challeng-
ing times because it comes back to identity… If we did not believe in the social mission, we 
would not have continued through those crazy times…” (Hub #1). Reflecting on the change 
process, one informant (Hub #20) told us in mid-2011: “Right now, it is a matter of identity: 
What makes Impact Hub? Who are we, and who do we want to be?” “In our core DNA there is 
a common cause, a common identity” argued another: “What is really ‘becoming’ a global net-
work is its strong identity and links between the hubs” (Hub #19). One of the informants (Hub 
#20) stressed that the fundamental question in 2010 was: “‘What is the authority’? In a [tradi-
tional] franchise, the authority is the franchisor. Right now, our authority is our vision which we 
can refer to when we discuss what should be the specifications and what makes the Hub.” Hub 
Association was created at the center of this revised business model to align franchisees around 
Impact Hub’s social mission. “What we have done is to elevate shared purposes, shared princi-
ples, and shared values… with the intent to hold each other to account” (Hub HQ).
The mission-driven social identity also included a sense of being part of a broader community. 
“[It is like] belonging to something larger than yourself…,” argued one informant: “When you 
walk [into a hub] and say ‘I’m a Hubber’, people will immediately be very welcoming to you, 
very friendly, and happy to share or help” (Hub #6). At first, we found the description of this 
community feeling difficult-to-accept, but we experienced it ourselves over several interactions 
we had with local hubs. For example, while collecting data for another project in May 2016, one 
author attended an event unannounced at an Impact Hub in Africa where he was met with some 
suspicion at the door. As soon as he told the host—who happened to be the local founder—that 
he was a member of another hub, the host greeted him warmly with a big hug and exclaimed: 
“Welcome, my friend: You’re family!”
Our data suggest that a mission-driven identity becomes more important and central as among 
more socially-oriented franchisors. This is conceptualized in the second-order theme “mis-
sion-driven identity as innovation guide.” While commercial franchisees also form deep social 
identities (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011) and perceptions of cohesion can reduce free riding (El 
Akremi et al., 2011), research suggests that these social forms of motivation or “clan control” are 
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secondary to “output controls” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ouchi, 1980) based on profits (Combs et al., 
2011). Even when franchisors decentralize most key decisions, it is done for economic reasons—
that is, because service delivery is complex and/or requires local adaptation—not (primarily) 
because a shared mission motivates and directs franchisees’ behavior—and franchisees are moti-
vated to perform in these decentralized franchises (e.g., real estate) because of their economic 
(output) incentives (Rubin, 1978).
Consistent with Tracey and Jarvis (2007), our data suggest that economic incentives are a less 
effective source of motivation among socially-oriented franchisees because their ultimate pur-
pose is to implement effective social solutions (cf., Krzeminska & Zeyen, 2017). While eco-
nomic incentives were certainly important—the franchisees could not perform their social 
mission while paying high royalties—our evidence suggests that Impact Hub franchisees joined 
because they believed in its social mission and that their loyalty to the shared identity was an 
important mechanism holding them together during turbulent times. In this respect, the revised 
and less hefty financial arrangement was perceived as less relevant than other changes designed 
“precisely to avoid putting such a profit-led mechanism at the core of a network whose vision 
was to support social entrepreneurship” (Hub #7a). Tracey and Jarvis hinted at the importance of 
this “shared identity and sense of purpose that characterized early franchise interactions” (Tracey 
& Jarvis, 2007, p. 679). Research argues that an organization’s identity “acts as a guidepost for 
organizational action [and] influences which organizational activities are pursued” (Anthony & 
Tripsas, 2016, pp. 417, 418). Our data suggest that the specific franchise business model adapta-
tions Impact Hub adopted (described below) were both stimulated and made possible by the 
organization’s strong shared mission-driven identity. We thus formalize our third proposition:
Proposition 1c: The more important the social mission, the more adaptations to the franchise busi-
ness model leverage the motivation provided by a shared social mission-driven identity.
Mission-Driven Identity Adaptations to the Franchise Business Model
Having a mission-driven identity has been identified as a common and important element in 
social entrepreneurship outside of the franchising context (e.g., Battilana & Lee, 2014). Our data 
suggest that this shared identity guided the model in particular ways with respect to decision 
making, governance, and network leadership, as conceptualized in the next set of three sec-
ond-order themes.
Decentralized decision making. At the meeting in Amsterdam, strong demand for more democratic 
and fairer management emerged: “We want to share value; we don’t want to be ‘adapted’ from a 
central organization that captures value from the local organizations.” (Hub #8). There was a 
desire to “go back to the original idea of decentralizing power to local hubs, with a democratic, 
open process” (Hub #3).
Importantly, the desire for decentralization and local control was a direct expression of the 
shared mission-driven identity. “People wanted to be driving this [social mission] themselves” 
(Hub #11). Franchisees sought a horizontal redistribution of responsibilities “so that each of us 
could add [social mission] value to the network” and “so that the contribution of local hubs to 
supporting new openings could be recognized” (Hub #10). “We were pushing for decentralized 
decision making… [but] If we had just decided to decentralize, we would have become a loose 
network… but we valued [what we called] ‘value-creating coherence’… that’s where the Volcano 
model came out of” (Hub #1).
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There isn’t a magic wand to manage a global network… a confederation where power is diffused 
among the nodes… the center dilutes its power every time a new hub joins… but it is a necessary 
journey of participation to strengthen the [social mission-driven] identity of the network (Hub #7a).
The new decentralized franchising structure re-initiated growth because it improved the adapt-
ability of the business model to a wider variety of local conditions. Impact Hub was on a trajec-
tory to become “a global network yet very much contextualized in each country” (Hub #10). “We 
started something which is locally rooted and international connected,” one franchisee (Hub #1) 
argued; “[We] call it translocality: it means being able to co-create something new with your own 
uniqueness [based on the global model].” The implementation of the general franchising model 
to the local context required franchisees “to get into the core of the understanding of the mind-set 
of local people, how they look at business [in the local community]” (Hub #2). After years of 
turbulence in its governance, all franchisees were fully autonomous, but all aligned around the 
same mission-driven identity. “We want to go in the same direction and create a space for people 
who have ideas for a better world… We have, however, the same vision which is adapted differ-
ently country by country” (Hub #1).
More commercially-oriented franchisors also sometimes decentralize extensively but for dif-
ferent reasons. When customers are mobile and expect the same service quality at each outlet, 
commercial franchisors typically control all core decisions (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1999) and only 
give franchisees a limited range of control over decisions that require local decision making, 
such as staffing (Mumdžiev & Windsperger, 2011) and pricing (Lafontaine, 1999). However, 
when the service is complex (e.g., real estate), customers are not particularly mobile (e.g., fitness 
centers), and in product license franchising (e.g., autos and gasoline), franchisees are often given 
considerable latitude to select and design facilities and tailor offerings to local clients’ needs 
(Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998; Mumdžiev & Windsperger, 2011).
Our data show that the social mission is an additional factor that facilitated decentralization at 
Impact Hub. Decentralized decision making at Impact Hub was made possible in part by some 
of the same practical reasons found among more commercially-oriented franchisors—that is, 
service delivery is complex, local needs are important, and Impact Hub’s members rarely travel 
to or expect identical services from other hubs. However, the shared mission-driven identity also 
played a role in facilitating decentralization in that the franchisor and other franchisees could 
trust that everyone would work hard to fulfill the organization’s mission. Commercially-oriented 
franchisees will also work hard without direct supervision, but their motivation is to maximize 
local profits (Lafontaine, 1992; Shane, 1996), and they sometimes do so by “free-riding” on the 
brand’s reputation (Kidwell et al., 2007; Rubin, 1978). Free riding was less of a problem in our 
data because franchisees’ central motivation came from their shared identity, which made it pos-
sible to decentralize without developing extensive procedures to monitor and correct franchisee 
behavior. “There really wasn’t any quality monitoring… because we trusted each other” (Hub 
#1). Stated formally:
Proposition 2a: The more important the social mission, the more a shared mission-driven identity 
among franchisees drives the business model toward decentralized decision making.
Shared governance. The new business model also included a substantial change toward shared 
governance with the creation of Hub Association. “That’s our call, this is why we see ourselves 
as a network of peers with no central entities controlling us” (Hub #9). The application process 
for new prospective franchisees, for example, now required recommendation letters from two 
existing hubs before being presented to the general assembly. Impact Hub now had “a model 
which is community-driven, it is run from the ground-up, and it is open to deviations… as long 
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as they are embraced by the community” (Hub #12). When we attended the global gathering in 
2015, we collected first-hand evidence of how this push toward shared governance had been 
incorporated into the contractual agreement with members, for example, by detailing how hubs 
were to measure social impact and common rules for, among other things, using the brand and 
logo, managing partnerships and new members, and building relationships between hubs.
We asked direct questions about the relationship between the social mission and governance 
changes and found evidence that the social mission-driven identity both influenced the desire for 
shared governance and made such governance possible.
[One reason why commercial] franchising did not work was… that value creation was not coming 
from one central body, it was coming from the edges which is in line with our [social] mission… You 
can’t sell something [to franchisees] based on collaboration and not make the [governance] model 
collaborative.
The social mission became how franchisees were held accountable:
More and more people [were saying] “how do we hold each other accountable?” …You need, for a 
lack of a better word, not legal contracts, but social [mission] contracts… In [commercial] franchises 
you can pull a franchisee away much more easily… it was very important to differentiate [our model] 
from commercial franchise (Hub #1).
“That is why we started a transition where every Hub is an equal partner” (Hub #8).
Franchisees also have a governance role in more commercially-oriented franchises. Early 
franchisees are often personally recruited by the founder, have direct communication with the 
founder, and feel like members of a family with a shared identity (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011). 
Larger franchisors often develop franchise councils comprised of selected franchisees who 
advised the franchisor on key decisions, and when there is conflict, independent franchise asso-
ciations form to air grievances and negotiate with the franchisor (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2010). 
Our data suggest, however, that as the social mission becomes relatively more important, it adds 
pressure toward adaptations that allow all stakeholders—including franchisees—to be more 
involved in organization-wide decisions. Prior research suggests that social organizations spend 
“considerable time, energy and other resources discussing and modifying their governance struc-
tures” (Widmer & Houchin, 1999, p. 34) to minimize the risks of mission drift (Santos, Pache, & 
Birkholz, 2015) and to strike a balance “between the need for greater efficiency and centraliza-
tion and the need for representation” (Cornforth, 2012: 14, emphasis in the original). Our data 
suggest that, at least in the social franchising context, the social mission-driven identity increases 
bottom-up pressure for representation and thus more collaborative ownership structures. More 
formally:
Proposition 2b: The more important the social mission, the more a shared mission-driven identity 
among franchisees creates pressure toward shared governance.
Franchisor as the “orchestrator” of collaborative knowledge sharing. The new Impact Hub franchisor 
(Hub Association) was given a new role as orchestrator of conversation and collaboration among 
hubs: “We put a lot of effort in building the infrastructure… to get more effective relationships 
between the various hubs” (Hub #11). Franchisees obtained more freedom in the new business 
model. Although collaborative knowledge sharing had always been central for Impact Hub, the 
franchisor was now specifically responsible for “gathering and sharing knowledge to support the 
whole network through training, networking opportunities, and access to specific technologies” 
Giudici et al. 305
(Hub #12). This more supporting role improved knowledge dynamics because franchisees felt 
“like partners working together rather than franchisees that are following instructions from the 
center… the relationship with [Hub Association] has been one of support, encouragement, 
advice, rather than instruction and insistence” (Hub #11). They welcomed sharing knowledge 
with others because they were “in a co-creating relationship with others for a shared purpose” 
(Hub #1), and because “Impact Hub is a value-based system where there is collaboration among 
people and entities” (Hub #5). Nonetheless, the franchisor maintained an important coordination 
and monitoring function. For example, Watson (2015) reported in the Financial Times that the 
franchisor had to find ways to control the risk of “local hub entrepreneurs selling out their stake 
to others who might not share the group’s social business agenda.”
As with decentralization and shared governance, the shared mission-driven identity both sup-
ports and helps make the franchisor’s new role possible. Fostering knowledge sharing is easier 
and more effective “if the center diffuses principles and values, rather than systems” (Hub #6).
Our most important values are trust, collaboration, and community… Every year we meet twice for 
the strategy gathering and the practice gathering… we definitely get benefits in network collabora-
tion… [if we need help] we can reach out to [Hub Association] and there is a lot of open trust, sharing 
and collaboration… that’s amazing! (Hub #6).
In comparing this final second-order theme—orchestrator of collaborative knowledge shar-
ing—with research focused on more commercially-oriented franchisors, we found that the mis-
sion-driven identity guides more socially-oriented franchisors a different leadership role with 
respect to knowledge dynamics. Horizontal knowledge flows among franchisees can be import-
ant in commercial settings. Darr et al. (1995), for example, show how a pizza chain’s franchisee 
innovated operational solutions that spread first to the franchisee’s other outlets, then to nearby 
franchisees, and then to others through regional franchisee gatherings. Castrogiovanni and Justis 
(1998) describe some franchisors as “confederations” of semi-autonomous franchisees who 
experiment locally to solve problems that are then shared with others through franchisee councils 
and/or the franchisor’s intranet. However, because such sharing is voluntary (Darr et al., 1995), 
franchisors typically bear responsibility for refining the franchisee’s business model, either 
through investments in new knowledge—for example, new product development, brand build-
ing, IT systems—or through the discovery, evaluation, and codification of knowledge from fran-
chisees (Bradach, 1997; Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1999). The franchisor also needs to manage 
vertical knowledge flows through communication (e.g., training programs) and by monitoring 
ongoing implementation of operating procedures (Kidwell et al., 2007). In short, while both 
horizontal and vertical knowledge flows are important, franchising research tends to emphasize 
vertical knowledge flows.
Rather than learning about, evaluating, and promoting best practices top-down, the evidence 
from Impact Hub suggests that social franchisors benefit from greater focus on horizontal knowl-
edge—by encouraging and facilitating collaborative knowledge sharing across geographically 
dispersed franchisees (cf., “open-system orchestration” in Giudici, Reinmoeller, & Ravasi, 
2018). The shared mission-driven identity provides franchisees with a stronger motivation to 
share and collaborate than what is found among more commercially-oriented franchisors. In the 
new structure, the franchisor serves as a repository for best practices, but its main goals became 
(a) to make sure that local hubs have all the necessary resources to innovate locally, (b) to con-
nect the hubs so that franchisees could learn from each other, and (c) to foster collaborative 
engagement among franchisees and members. Accordingly, we submit the following proposition 
that formalizes this peculiar franchisor role:
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Proposition 2c: The more important the social mission, the more a shared mission driven-identity 
shifts a social franchisor’s role toward the orchestration of collaborative knowledge sharing among 
franchisees (i.e., horizontal learning) and away from centrally codifying and teaching franchisees 
(i.e., vertical learning).
Discussion
Although social entrepreneurs have increasingly turned to franchising to scale social value, the-
oretical and empirical advances have been limited. Tracey and Jarvis (2007) observed that the 
social mission creates a destabilizing source of conflict in social franchising, but there has been 
little understanding of how social franchisors successfully overcome this challenge. To illumi-
nate this issue, we conducted a field study of how Impact Hub, one of the largest social franchises 
by geographic reach, successfully innovated its business model and navigated the challenges 
identified by Tracey and Jarvis (2007).
Theoretical Contributions
We contribute to social entrepreneurship research in two main ways. First, we provide theoretical 
elaboration and empirical substantiation to the idea that the social mission can be a source of 
business model innovation and not just a source of conflict and tension. Although the distinction 
between social and commercial entrepreneurship can be conceptualized along a continuum with 
several shades of gray between purely social and purely commercial (Austin et al., 2006), prior 
work often treats the social mission as fundamentally at odds with the commercial mission and 
extensively highlights the trade-offs that socially-oriented organizations face when balancing 
diverging goals (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011; see Doherty, Haugh, & Lyon, 2014, for a review). 
Wry and York (2017), however, questioned this long-held view and theorized that the social 
mission can be a source of innovation with respect to social organizations’ business models. Our 
study substantiates and expands upon their theorizing in the franchising context. Not only did the 
attractive vision become the glue that held stakeholders together during turbulent times 
(Proposition 1a), the resulting shared mission-driven identity motivated them to find solutions 
(Proposition 1b), and the solutions they found leverage the mission-focused motivation that 
comes from a shared identity (Proposition 1c). The idea that shared values and norms can substi-
tute for behavioral monitoring and/or output controls is not new (Mintzberg, 1989; Ouchi, 1980), 
but despite the importance of the social mission in social entrepreneurship (e.g., Austin et al., 
2006), its role in business model design was yet to be elaborated in the social franchising 
context.
Our second contribution to social entrepreneurship research is to explain how franchising can 
be used to successfully scale social value. Prior research offers rich insights into the resources 
and capabilities (e.g., Liu, Eng, & Takeda, 2015) and alternative strategic approaches (e.g., Di 
Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010) that foster growth among social organizations. Yet, we know 
little about the organizational models that support scaling social value (cf., Cannatelli, Smith, 
Giudici, Jones, & Conger, 2017; Smith et al., 2016). We take a step in this direction by theorizing 
and illustrating how the shared mission-driven identity encouraged (a) decentralized decision 
making, (b) shared governance, and (c) a shift in the franchisor’s leadership role away from ver-
tical knowledge transfer toward the orchestration of collaborative knowledge sharing. All of 
these features can be found to some extent among commercially-oriented franchisors (e.g., 
Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011; Meek et al., 2011), but our evidence suggests that the shared mis-
sion-driven identity is an additional force that pushes franchisors’ business models, all else equal, 
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further along these dimensions. Social franchisors are freer to take an additional step in these 
directions because franchisees can (and expect) to be trusted to carry out the organization’s mis-
sion without overt supervision and, as Tracey and Jarvis (2007) demonstrated, economic incen-
tives are not particularly helpful in this context.
Our theoretical contributions and insights are grounded in a single case study of a social orga-
nization, Impact Hub, that provides business incubation and co-working spaces and services. 
While we are unable to establish external validity and rule out the possibility that incubators 
present somewhat idiosyncratic characteristics that do not apply to other social organizations, 
this limitation is attenuated by the potential for analytical generalizability (Yin, 2013). In line 
with best-practice approaches to analytical generalizability (see Cardador & Pratt, 2017 for a 
recent example), our work provides an important starting point for theory development in an 
area, social franchising, that is still emerging. In addition, the kind of organization that we inves-
tigated—a network of business incubators and co-working spaces—is far from contextually 
unique but one among many organizations engaging in what recent work calls “open-system 
orchestration” (Giudici et al., 2018) that involves leading and supporting innovation and collab-
orative knowledge sharing among geographically dispersed actors. Open-system orchestrators 
include business incubators and other “pro-social” organizations such as venture associations 
and government agencies (Giudici et al., 2018). Although it is ultimately an empirical question, 
we believe that our findings about the role of the social mission in fostering business model 
adaptations could be transferred to many such organizations. There are also several global non-
profit organizations engaged in social entrepreneurship, such as E4Impact, the School for Social 
Entrepreneurs, and the Trussell Trust, that have adopted social franchise business models similar 
to Impact Hub, reinforcing the notion that our theoretical insights have potential to be transferred 
to similar organizations in similar contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Overall, our contributions regarding (a) the social mission as a source of franchise business 
model innovation, and (b) the adaptations that leverage the shared mission-driven identity appear 
to have analytical generalizability, and thus have implications for both social entrepreneurship 
and commercial franchising research.
Implications for Future Research
Implications for social entrepreneurship research. Our study provides evidence in one context sup-
porting recent theory that tensions between commercial and social goals can be harnessed to 
better achieve both (e.g., Battilana et al., 2015). Recent evidence, however, highlights that there 
are important contingencies that impact the ability of social entrepreneurs to manage tensions 
between social and commercial goals; social impact appears easier with less intractable prob-
lems, supportive institutional contexts, and skilled management (Wry & Zhao, 2018). Recent 
theory also suggests that different social entrepreneurs identify differently with their social and 
commercial missions (Wry & York, 2017). Taken together with our findings, future research 
might benefit from investigating how specific business model adaptations and their effectiveness 
with respect to social and commercial missions vary across both institutional contexts (Wry & 
Zhao, 2018) and social actor’s identity (Wry & York, 2017). For example, Santos et al. (2015) 
suggested that the risk of (social) mission drift is higher and financial sustainability more difficult 
in contexts where beneficiaries are different from the social organization’s clients. Thus, future 
research might compare the business model adaptations that we identified (where the ultimate 
beneficiaries are clients of the franchisees) with those identified by Kistruck et al. (2011) in 
micro-franchising (where the franchisees are the beneficiaries). It seems likely that one important 
distinction is that the mission-driven identity is shared by both the franchisor and franchisees in 
social franchises like the kind we studied but might only be held by the franchisor in 
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micro-franchising. Thus, adaptations such as shared governance that helped Impact Hub thrive 
might be less likely in the base of the pyramid context where micro-franchising often occurs 
(Kistruck et al., 2011)..
A second implication our study offers for social entrepreneurship research is the need to con-
sider “socialficing”: “the purposeful pursuit of social objectives at the expense of financial effi-
ciency” (Kistruck, Beamish, Qureshi, & Sutter, 2013, p. 60). This notion was developed as an 
analog to Simon’s (1957) concept of “satisficing” to recognize less-than-optimal outcomes cre-
ated by trade-offs between financial and social goals. In our study, franchisees who were not 
benefitting from Impact Hub’s business model invested their time and money into the franchise 
because of their shared mission-driven identity, effectively trading-off financial efficiency to pre-
serve social value. The existence of socialficing behavior among social franchisees in our case 
generates salient questions such as: Is socialficing a trade-off judgment that social entrepreneurs 
make a priori or a rationalization after underperformance in either the social or financial realm? 
Is there a minimum threshold for financial stability that could be acceptable for social franchi-
sees, and social entrepreneurs more broadly? How does socialficing behavior vary across types 
of entrepreneurs and social organizations and environments?
Another future research implication is that our results point to the need to investigate how the 
embeddedness of social ties shape the scaling of social value. Prior research theorized that the 
degree of embeddedness is inversely related to the potential scale of geographic growth and 
positively related to more autonomy among key actors (Smith & Stevens, 2010). The case of 
Impact Hub seems to confirm the latter prediction because its business model shifted toward 
more decentralized (autonomous) decision making. Diverting from the former prediction, how-
ever, strong embedded social ties remained even as the organization continued to grow. Our case 
data imply that growth despite embedded ties occurred with the support of a strong social iden-
tity, and a change in the franchisor’s role from one of vertical knowledge distributor to horizontal 
knowledge orchestrator—highlighting the need for social entrepreneurs’ roles to change as the 
enterprise evolves (Cannatelli et al., 2017; Santos, 2012). Accordingly, we believe that a deeper 
appreciation of how social embeddedness enables or constraints the scaling of social value is a 
promising avenue for future research.
Implications for future franchising research. By explaining ways that a strong shared mission-driven 
identity influenced the direction of a social franchisor’s business model, our contributions are 
primarily to social entrepreneurship research. However, our findings also raise questions for 
research on more commercially-oriented franchisors. An emerging “symbiosis perspective” 
describes the balance between chain-wide standardization and local market adaptation as a cen-
tral challenge for franchisors (Perryman & Combs, 2012); company-owned outlets are viewed as 
keepers of standardization and franchisees are the source of innovation and adaptation. Although 
the symbiosis perspective suggests that franchisors benefit from learning about franchisees’ local 
innovations, most emphasis remains on enforcing standardization (Ater & Rigbi, 2015) and fran-
chisors appear slow to learn about franchisee innovations (Darr et al., 1995). Our observation 
that Impact Hub transitioned successfully into an orchestrator of collaboration among franchi-
sees leads us to wonder if some commercial franchisors might develop better “orchestration 
capabilities” (cf. Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006) than others with respect to their franchisees and 
raises questions for future research about what organizational structures might facilitate this. 
Existing evidence suggests that franchisors differ in the quality of communication with franchi-
sees and that such communication can improve outcomes (e.g., Meek et al., 2011), but little is 
known about how franchisors develop communication capabilities and whether these are part of 
a larger set of capabilities for working with franchisees. Do such franchisors send more people 
to and openly engage with franchisees at their annual meeting? Do they incentivize the 
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“consultants” who work with franchisees to bring back franchisee adaptations for further testing 
(or do they reward consultants for keeping franchisees from innovating)? Do they have person-
nel dedicated to learning about and testing franchisee innovations?
Although much research focuses on the role of standardization (e.g., Ater & Rigbi, 2015; 
Bradach, 1997), commercial franchise business models vary considerably, especially in terms of 
the extent to which franchisees have autonomy to adapt products and services to the local market 
(Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998; Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1999). However, the theoretical rationale 
for such variance is usually economic—for example, because local offerings are complex, cus-
tomized, or require modifications to meet local demands (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998; 
Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1999; Mumdžiev & Windsperger, 2011). Our study suggests that Impact 
Hub’s franchise model shared characteristics with the decentralized “confederation form” 
described by Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) but also that the social mission generates addi-
tional pressure that pushes social franchising a step further, closer to Mintzberg’s (1989) “mis-
sionary organization,” which is held together by members’ shared identity and values. Prior 
research suggests that franchisees in a commercial context can have a shared identity (Lawrence 
& Kaufmann, 2011) and that perceived trust (Chiou et al., 2004) and cohesion (El Akremi et al., 
2011) yield better outcomes, but the possibility that relational factors such as a shared identity 
among franchisees might also, as in the missionary organization, move the business model fur-
ther toward decentralization, greater franchisee voice, or change the franchisor’s leadership role, 
has not been considered and seems worthy of future inquiry. It might also be fruitful to ask these 
questions of other geographically dispersed network organizations, such as retailers’ or produc-
ers’ cooperatives, that share features with franchising but use different contracts and/or fee 
structures.
Implications for Social Entrepreneurs
Our findings offer practical guidance for social organizations seeking to scale social value via 
franchising. First, given the importance of shared mission-driven identity, our study implies that 
social franchisors will gain from investing time and attention assessing potential franchisees’ 
commitment to the social mission during franchisee recruitment and selection. This is important 
because monetary incentives lack motivational force (Krzeminska & Zeyen, 2017), leaving the 
shared mission as the primary source of franchisee motivation. In our study, Impact Hub accom-
plished this in part by requiring prospective franchisees to acquire two referrals from existing 
hubs. Second, because the shared-mission driven identity is the primary hedge against free-rid-
ing, results imply that social franchisors might benefit from shifting resources away from moni-
toring toward activities that reinforce the shared identity, such as ongoing councils and frequent 
conferences. Impact Hub orchestrated regular global franchisee gatherings—like the one we 
attended in 2015—and used task forces with members from several hubs to manage specific 
franchisee management and growth processes. Indeed, such a resource shift might also benefit 
commercial franchisors as a means of lowering agency costs—at least among those where fran-
chisees identify strongly with the brand.
Conclusion
Although many social entrepreneurs have turned toward franchising as a way to scale social 
value, theory development for explaining how the franchise business model might be adapted to 
the social context has lagged behind. Tracey and Jarvis (2007) showed that social franchising is 
indeed distinct from more commercially-oriented franchising, and that the social mission creates 
challenges regarding how to balance social and financial goals. Our detailed investigation of a 
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social franchisor that overcame these challenges showed that the social mission can be a power-
ful source of business model innovation and that franchisees’ devotion to a shared mission-driven 
identity is central. It not only motivated stakeholders to find adaptive solutions within the fran-
chise model, the solutions they identified leverage the motivation that shared identities bring. 
Our hope is that these insights spark fruitful future inquiry for both social entrepreneurship and 
franchising research.
Acknowledgments
This paper has greatly benefitted from the support and comments provided by the Editor Maw-Der 
Foo and three anonymous reviewers whom we thank sincerely. We also gratefully acknowledge the 
constructive comments of Charles Baden-Fuller, Mario Molteni, Francesco Rullani, Tyler Wry and 
participants in the workshop of the Research Group on Collaborative Spaces (RGCS) at Kings' College 
(London, UK) in 2015. We also thank all anonymous reviewers and participants at the 5th “Leuphana 
Conference on Entrepreneurship” in 2015, at the 1st “IESE-LUISS Conference on Responsibility, 
Sustainability, and Social Entrepreneurship” in 2017, and at the EGOS, AOM, and SMS conferences 
in 2016. We would also like to thank Impact Hub management and informants who kindly provided 
extensive access, time and feedback in the data collection. All errors remain ours.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or 
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or 
publication of this article: The paper has received financial support to complete the collection of data and 
the writing process from the UK Research Council (EP/K039695/1 Building Better Business Models), 
which we thankfully recognize. 
ORCID ID
Alessandro Giudici  http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 6033- 1643
James G. Combs  http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0003- 2913- 3934
Note
1. We acknowledge, but do not cover in this paper, the fact that in 2015 Impact Hub initiated further trans-
formation of its governance (labeled ‘3.0 governance’) wherein transparent accountability based on 
shared measurement systems and protocols for relational norms became progressively more important.
References
Alon, I. (Ed.). (2014). Social franchising. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Anthony, C., & Tripsas, M. (2016). Organizational identity and innovation. In M. G. Pratt, M. Schultz, B. 
E. Ashforth, & D. Ravasi (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of organizational identity (pp. 417–435). New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Ater, I., & Rigbi, O. (2015). Price control and advertising in franchising chains. Strategic Management 
Journal, 36(1), 148–158.
Austin, J., Stevenson, H., & Wei-Skillern, J. (2006). Social and commercial entrepreneurship: Same, differ-
ent, or both? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(1), 1–22.
Bachmann, M. (2014). How the hub found its center. Stanford Social Innovation Review, 1, 22–27.
Giudici et al. 311
Baden-Fuller, C., & Mangematin, V. (2013). Business models: A challenging agenda. Strategic Organiza-
tion, 11(4), 418–427.
Battilana, J., & Lee, M. (2014). Advancing research on hybrid organizing – insights from the study of social 
enterprises. Academy of Management Annals, 8(1), 397–441.
Battilana, J., Sengul, M., Pache, A. -C., & Model, J. (2015). Harnessing productive tensions in hybrid 
organizations: The case of work integration social enterprises. Academy of Management Journal, 
58(6), 1658–1685.
Bloom, P. N., & Smith, B. R. (2010). Identifying the drivers of social entrepreneurial impact: Theoretical 
development and an exploratory empirical test of SCALERS. Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 1(1), 
126–145.
Bradach, J. L. (1997). Using the plural form in the management of restaurant chains. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 42(2), 276–303.
Bruder, R. (2013, January). The social franchise model works in times of uncertainty. Harvard Business 
Review. Retrieved from https:// hbr. org/ 2013/ 01/ the- social- franchise- model- wor
Cannatelli, B., Smith, B., Giudici, A., Jones, J., & Conger, M. (2017). An expanded model of distributed 
leadership in organizational knowledge creation. Long Range Planning, 50(5), 582–602.
Castrogiovanni, G. J., Combs, J. G., & Justis, R. T. (2006). Shifting imperatives: An integrative view of 
resource scarcity and agency reasons for franchising. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(1), 
23–40.
Cardador, M. T., & Pratt, M. G. (2017). Becoming who we serve: A model of multi-layered employee-cus-
tomer identification. Academy of Management Journal. Advance online publication. doi: 10.5465/
amj.2015.1201
Castrogiovanni, G. J., & Justis, R. T. (1998). Franchising configurations and transitions. Journal of Con-
sumer Marketing, 15(2), 170–190.
Chiou, J. -S., Hsieh, C. -H., & Yang, C. -H. (2004). The effect of franchisors’ communication, service assis-
tance, and competitive advantage on franchisees’ intentions to remain in the franchise system. Journal 
of Small Business Management, 42(1), 19–36.
Christensen, L. J., Parsons, H., & Fairbourne, J. (2010). Building entrepreneurship in subsistence markets: 
Microfranchising as an employment incubator. Journal of Business Research, 63(6), 595–601.
Cochet, O., Dormann, J., & Ehrmann, T. (2008). Capitalizing on franchisee autonomy: Relational forms 
of governance as controls in idiosyncratic franchise dyads. Journal of Small Business Management, 
46(1), 50–72.
Cochet, O., & Ehrmann, T. (2007). Preliminary evidence on the appointment of institutional solutions to 
franchisor moral hazard—the case of franchisee councils. Managerial and Decision Economics, 28(1), 
41–55.
Combs, J. G., Ketchen, D. J., Shook, C. L., & Short, J. C. (2011). Antecedents and consequences of fran-
chising: Past accomplishments and future challenges. Journal of Management, 37(1), 99–126.
Dacin, P. A., Dacin, M. T., & Matear, M. (2010). Social entrepreneurship: Why don't we need a new theory 
and how we move forward from here. Academy of Management Perspective, 24(3), 37–57.
Dacin, M. T., Dacin, P. A., & Tracey, P. (2011). Social entrepreneurship: A critique and future directions. 
Organization Science, 22(5), 1203–1213.
Danneels, E. (2002). The dynamics of product innovation and firm competences. Strategic Management 
Journal, 23(12), 1095–1121.
Darr, E. D., Argote, L., & Epple, D. (1995). The acquisition, transfer, and depreciation of knowledge in 
service organizations: Productivity in franchises. Management Science, 41(11), 1750–1762.
Dhanaraj, C., & Parkhe, A. (2006). Orchestrating innovation networks. Academy of Management Review, 
31(3), 659–669.
Di Domenico, M., Haugh, H., & Tracey, P. (2010). Social bricolage: Theorizing social value creation in 
social enterprise. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(4), 681–703.
312 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 44(2)
Doherty, B., Haugh, H., & Lyon, F. (2014). Social enterprises as hybrid organizations: A review and research 
agenda. International Journal of Management Reviews, 16(4), 417–436.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 
14(1), 57–74.
El Akremi, A., Mignonac, K., & Perrigot, R. (2011). Opportunistic behaviors in franchise chains: the role 
of cohesion among franchisees. Strategic Management Journal, 32(9), 930–948.
Fladmoe-Lindquist, K., & Jacque, L. L. (1995). Control modes in international service operations: The 
propensity to franchise. Management Science, 41(7), 1238–1249.
Gephart, R. P. (2004). Qualitative research and the academy of management journal. Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, 47(4), 454–462.
Gillis, W., & Castrogiovanni, G. J. (2012). The franchising business model: an entrepreneurial growth alter-
native. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 8(1), 75–98.
Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Hamilton, A. L. (2013). Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive research: Notes 
on the Gioia methodology. Organizational Research Methods, 16(1), 15–31.
Giudici, A., Reinmoeller, P., & Ravasi, D. (2018). Open-system orchestration as a relational source of 
sensing capabilities: Evidence from a venture association. Academy of Management Journal, 61(4), 
1369–1402.
Jin, G. Z., & Leslie, P. (2009). Reputational incentives for restaurant hygiene. American Economic Journal: 
Microeconomics, 1(1), 237–267.
Kaufmann, P. J., & Eroglu, S. (1999). Standardization and adaptation in business format franchising. Jour-
nal of Business Venturing, 14(1), 69–85.
Kidwell, R. E., Nygaard, A., & Silkoset, R. (2007). Antecedents and effects of free riding in the franchisor–
franchisee relationship. Journal of Business Venturing, 22(4), 522–544.
Kistruck, G. M., Beamish, P. W., Qureshi, I., & Sutter, C. J. (2013). Social intermediation in base-of-the-
pyramid markets. Journal of Management Studies, 50(1), 31–66.
Kistruck, G. M., Webb, J. W., Sutter, C. J., & Ireland, R. D. (2011). Microfranchising in base-of-the-pyra-
mid markets: Institutional challenges and adaptations to the franchise model. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 35(3), 503–531.
Krzeminska, A., & Zeyen, A. (2017). A stewardship cost perspective on the governance of delegation rela-
tionships: The case of social franchising. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 46(1), 71–91.
Lafontaine, F. (1992). Agency theory and franchising: Some empirical results. The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 23(2), 263–283.
Lafontaine, F. (1999). Franchising versus corporate ownership: The effect on price dispersion. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 14(1), 17–34.
Lafontaine, F., & Shaw, K. L. (2005). Targeting managerial control: Evidence from franchising. RAND 
Journal of Economics, 36(1), 131–150.
Langley, A., Smallman, C., Tsoukas, H., & Van de Ven, A. H. (2013). Process studies of change in organi-
zation and management: Unveiling temporality, activity, and flow. Academy of Management Journal, 
56(1), 1–13.
Lawrence, B., & Kaufmann, P. J. (2010). Franchisee associations: Strategic focus or response to franchisor 
opportunism. Journal of Marketing Channels, 17(2), 137–155.
Lawrence, B., & Kaufmann, P. J. (2011). Identity in franchise systems: The role of franchisee associations. 
Journal of Retailing, 87(3), 285–305.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Liu, G., Eng, T. -Y., & Takeda, S. (2015). An investigation of marketing capabilities and social enterprise 
performance in the UK and Japan. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(2), 267–298.
Meek, W. R., Davis-Sramek, B., Baucus, M. S., & Germain, R. N. (2011). Commitment in franchising: The 
role of collaborative communication and a franchisee's propensity to leave. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 35(3), 559–581.
Giudici et al. 313
Meyskens, M., Robb-Post, C., Stamp, J. A., Carsrud, A. L., & Reynolds, P. D. (2010). Social ventures from 
a resource-based perspective: An exploratory study assessing global Ashoka fellows. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 34(4), 661–680.
Michael, S. C. (2000). The effect of organizational form on quality: The case of franchising. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 43(3), 295–318.
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2014). Qualitative data analysis: A methods sourcebook 
(3rd ed). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Miller, T. L., Grimes, M. G., McMullen, J. S., & Vogus, T. J. (2012). Venturing for others with heart and 
head: How compassion encourages social entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Review, 37(4), 
616–640.
Mintzberg, H. (1989). Mintzberg on management. New York, NY: Free Press.
Moss, T. W., Short, J. C., Payne, G. T., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2011). Dual identities in social ventures: An 
exploratory study. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(4), 805–830.
Mumdžiev, N., & Windsperger, J. (2011). The structure of Decision rights in franchising networks: A prop-
erty rights perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(3), 449–465.
Nicholls, A. (2010). The legitimacy of social entrepreneurship: Reflexive isomorphism in a pre-paradig-
matic field. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(4), 611–633.
Norton, S. W. (1988). Franchising, brand name capital, and the entrepreneurial capacity problem. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9(S1), 105–114.
Oster, S. M. (1992). Nonprofit organizations as franchise operations. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 
2(3), 223–238.
Oster, S. M. (1996). Nonprofit organizations and their local affiliates: A study in organizational forms. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 30(1), 83–95.
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(1), 129–141.
Oxenfeldt, A. R., & Kelly, A. O. (1969). Will successful franchise systems ultimately become wholly-owned 
chains? Journal of Retailing, 44(4), 69–83.
Perryman, A. A., & Combs, J. G. (2012). Who should own it? An agency-based explanation for multi-outlet 
ownership and co-location in plural form franchising. Strategic Management Journal, 33(4), 368–386.
Rey-Martí, A., Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Palacios-Marqués, D. (2016). A bibliometric analysis of social entre-
preneurship. Journal of Business Research, 69(5), 1651–1655.
Rubin, P. H. (1978). The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 21(1), 223–233.
Santos, F. M. (2012). A positive theory of social entrepreneurship. Journal of Business Ethics, 111(3), 
335–351.
Santos, F., Pache, A. -C., & Birkholz, C. (2015). Making hybrids work: Aligning business models and 
organizational design for social enterprises. California Management Review, 57(3), 36–58.
Shane, S. A. (1996). Hybrid organizational arrangements and their implications for firm growth and sur-
vival: A study of new franchisors. Academy of Management Journal, 39(1), 216–234.
Shane, S. (2001). Organizational incentives and organizational mortality. Organization Science, 12(2), 
136–160.
Simon, H. A. (1957). The compensation of executives. Sociometry, 20(1), 32–35.
Smith, W. K., Besharov, M. L., Wessels, A. K., & Chertok, M. (2012). A paradoxical leadership model 
for social entrepreneurs: Challenges, leadership skills, and pedagogical tools for managing social and 
commercial demands. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 11(3), 463–478.
Smith, B. R., Kistruck, G. M., & Cannatelli, B. (2016). The impact of moral intensity and desire for control 
on scaling decisions in social entrepreneurship. Journal of Business Ethics, 133(4), 677–689.
Smith, B. R., & Stevens, C. E. (2010). Different types of social entrepreneurship: The role of geography 
and embeddedness on the measurement and scaling of social value. Entrepreneurship & Regional 
Development, 22(6), 575–598.
314 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 44(2)
Stephan, U., Patterson, M., Kelly, C., & Mair, J. (2016). Organizations driving positive social change: A 
review and an integrative framework of change processes. Journal of Management, 42(5), 1250–1281.
Stevens, R., Moray, N., & Bruneel, J. (2015). The social and economic mission of social enterprises: 
Dimensions, measurement, validation, and relation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(5), 
1051–1082.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing 
grounded theory (2nd ed). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Tracey, P., & Jarvis, O. (2007). Toward a theory of social venture franchising. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 31(5), 667–685.
Watson, N. (2015). Impact hub takes on all the fervour of ‘a movement’ as network increases. Financial 
Times. Retrieved from www. ft. com/ content/ da67160e- e8d9- 11e4- b7e8- 00144feab7de
Widmer, C., & Houchin, S. (1999). Governance of national federated organizations (Working paper, Non-
profit Sector Research Fund). Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute.
Wry, T., & York, J. G. (2017). An identity-based approach to social enterprise. Academy of Management 
Review, 42(3), 437–460.
Wry, T., & Zhao, E. Y. (2018). Taking tradeoffs seriously: Examining the contextually contingent relation-
ship between social outreach intensity and financial sustainability in global microfinance. Organization 
Science, 29(3), 507–528.
Yin, R. K. (2013). Validity and generalization in future case study evaluations. Evaluation, 19(3), 321–332.
Author Biographies
Alessandro Giudici ( alessandro. giudici. 2@ city. ac. uk) is a Senior Lecturer in Strategy at Cass 
Business School (City, University of London). His research focuses on relational mechanisms in 
support of innovation among dispersed actors in entrepreneurial ecosystems. He is particularly 
interested in e.g., incubators, accelerators, government agencies, venture associations and in 
social entrepreneurship contexts.
James G. Combs ( james. combs@ ucf. edu) is the Della Phillips Martha Schenck Chair of 
American Private Enterprise at the College of Business at the University of Central Florida and 
Visiting Professor at the Telfer School of Management at the University of Ottawa.
Benedetto Lorenzo Cannatelli ( benedetto. cannatelli@ unicatt. it) is Assistant Professor in 
Entrepreneurship and Strategy at Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan and member of 
ALTIS, the University's Graduate School of Business and Society. His research is at the intersec-
tions between strategy and entrepreneurship, with emphasis on social entrepreneurship contexts. 
In 2009 he was visiting scholar at the Lester Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation at 
HAAS School of Business. In 2010 and 2011 he was visiting scholar at the Center for Social 
Entrepreneurship at Farmer School of Business, Miami University.
Brett R. Smith ( smithbr2@ miamioh. edu) is the Cintas Endowed Chair of Entrepreneurship and 
Founding Director, Center for Social Entrepreneurship at Miami University. He received his PhD 
from the University of Cincinnati. His research interests focus on social entrepreneurship with 
specific emphases on the scaling of social impact and new development models.
